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varian transplantation, for all its apparent novelty, 
has a long history: as Oktay and Yih observe, "The 
idea of fresh orthotopic autologous ovarian trans-
plantation in humans is neither novel nor sophisti-
cated; a New York surgeon reported on this technique as early as 
in 1906."1  However, fresh autologous transplantation -- remov-
ing the ovary from the same location to which it is retransplanted 
-- is not particularly useful in itself; rather, two modern ad-
vances, frozen autologous transplantation and heterologous 
transplantation, have returned ovarian transplantation to the 
spotlight. The former, made possible by improved cryopreserva-
tive technology, enabled a woman, Ouarda Touirat, whose ova-
ries were removed and frozen while she underwent chemother-
apy, to become pregnant after ovarian retransplantation.2 Mean-
while, Dr. Sherman Silber's transplant of fresh ovarian tissue be-
tween identical twins Melanie Morgan and Stephanie Yarber3 
has transformed heterologous ovarian transplantation from a 
philosophical thought-experiment into a genuine possibility. 
Before the above procedures become standard medical 
practice, they deserve an ethical analysis that is informed by up-
to-date literature. When compared to ARTs4 such as embryo 
cryopreservation, ovarian transplantation has the advantage of 
avoiding the creation or destruction of potential human life. 
However, as Robertson states in his discussion of an autologous 
ovarian transplant following cryopreservation,  
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Although this advance is unlikely to generate the 
controversies that reproductive innovations such 
as surrogacy and cloning have, important ethical 
issues will arise if such techniques lead to 
premenopausal ovarian storage by healthy 
women or ovary donation from cadavers or fe-
tuses.5 
 
The former issue Robertson raises relates to autologous trans-
plantation, while the latter involves concern about heterologous 
transplants. Since many ethical problems in autologous trans-
plantation also apply to heterologous transplantation, I will ini-
tially consider autologous transplantation, and then move on to 
issues unique to heterologous donation.  
This call to consider ethical issues is not a demand for a 
halt or slowdown in progress -- in fact, I hope to do just the op-
posite. Effective ethical analysis will suggest new areas in which 
this technology might be useful and should be accelerated, while 
realistically assessing its limitations in other arenas. In particular, 
I hope to treat religious views not as a roadblock to technological 
progress, but as an encouragement to develop technologies that 
serve patients whose religious beliefs prevent them from using 




Recent work on autologous ovarian transplantation has 
focused on cryopreservation of ovarian tissue, which enables 
strips of an ovary to be stored while ovary-damaging proce-
dures, such as chemotherapy and radiotherapy, are performed 
on the patient.6 These strips can then be retransplanted into the 
patient after the therapy is complete.  
The interim cryostorage of ovarian tissue produces ethical 
questions that parallel those raised by similar ARTs, such as oo-
cyte and embryo cryopreservation. Imagine a patient who dies 
from complications of chemotherapy after her ovaries have been 
removed and cryopreserved. Had she had oocytes or embryos 
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preserved, her partner or other family members might want to 
use them for vitro fertilization and/or surrogate gestation. This 
produces two ethical challenges: 
 
1) difficulties in confirming the deceased's intent to become a 
genetic parent  
2) concern for the welfare of the offspring, who will lack a 
biological mother  
 
(2) can be countered on the grounds that posthumous donation is 
analogous to anonymous oocyte or sperm donation, which is not 
thought to harm the offspring.7 However, this analogy is not per-
fect. Children of an anonymous oocyte donor will be unlikely to 
know the life story of their biological mother, while children of a 
posthumous donor will likely be raised with a full and perhaps 
saddening knowledge of their dead parent. Claim (1) seems even 
more troubling: imagine the case of a parent bringing grandchil-
dren into the world against the wishes of a (now-dead) child, for 
example. Notwithstanding these issues, however, oocyte and 
embryo cryopreservation do make posthumous procreation pos-
sible. 
In contrast, the ovarian tissue cryopreservation patient 
would likely be unable to procreate posthumously. Heterologous 
transplantation of the ovary would be fraught with immunologi-
cal problems.8 Neither in-vitro ovarian maturation nor ovarian 
xenotransplantation into immunodeficient mice, which would 
avoid organ rejection problems, are medically mature technolo-
gies; the latter is also ethically and epidemiologically problem-
atic.9 The ovary would therefore be unable to produce oocytes, 
because no location to which it might feasibly be transplanted 
would exist.  
This limitation might be considered an advantage. Unlike 
a cryopreserved embryo, where the moral status of the embryo 
and the claim of the father must be considered, cryopreserved 
ovarian tissue would be an extension of the patient's body, only 
usable as long as she exists. However, whether this restriction is 
counted a benefit or a disadvantage, the appropriate disposal 
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procedure for "stranded" ovarian tissue in the case of donor 
death -- should it be discarded? stored indefinitely in hope of ad-
vances in transplant technology? donated to research? -- must be 
established before ovarian tissue cryopreservation moves from 
experimental technique to standard medical practice. 
A second issue involves safety and patient access. Respect 
for patient autonomy suggests that ovarian cryopreservation 
could be permissible even in the absence of clear medical indica-
tions such as cancer: 
 
The autonomy of both males and females should 
be respected. Each person should be able to take 
measures to preserve his or her fertility whether 
threatened by disease or voluntary chosen inter-
ventions (such as vasectomy) or life-plan consid-
erations (the wish to have a child later).10 
 
Ovarian cryopreservation promises women the same fertility-
preservation options that sperm banking currently offers men. 
As well, cryopreservative technology could remove age-related 
gender inequalities both by decreasing the danger of aneuploidy 
caused by aging ovaries and by allowing reproductive potential 
to continue beyond current menopause.  As such, ovarian cryo-
preservation seems potentially both practically and ethically 
beneficial to patients who are not in danger of cancer. As Dr. 
Sherman Silber's infertility clinic states, "Ovarian tissue freezing 
is a new solution for these women who feel that by the time they 
do get married, or are otherwise ready to start a family, they will 
have lost all of their fertile eggs due to the aging process."11 
However, the greater invasiveness and lower effective-
ness of ovarian cryopreservation upsets the comparison with 
sperm banking. The ESHRE Task Force argues that the surgery is 
not medically beneficent: 
 
Whilst the use of frozen–thawed sperm has be-
come routine, the case is different for reproductive 
tissue cryopreservation. In view of the lack of suc-
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cess and clinical applications in the case of ovarian 
tissue, this application should not be offered to 
women as a means to preserve their fertility po-
tential when there is no immediate threat to their 
fertility.12 
 
Robertson argues for a ban by invoking another ethical principle, 
that of non-maleficence: 
 
[T]he burdens of elective oophorectomy would 
seem so much greater than the benefits that a phy-
sician who performed an oophorectomy in this 
situation might well be violating the medical ethi-
cal principle primum non nocere.13 
 
The clash between autonomy and beneficence/non-maleficence 
suggests a combination of both principles. Given that women 
have no fertility preservation method as effective as sperm bank-
ing--embryo freezing requires a partner, oocyte freezing is still 
unreliable,14 and both require risky, expensive, and complicated 
ovarian stimulation--experimental research into ovarian tissue 
cryopreservation should be encouraged and accelerated as a 
means to gender equity. Simultaneously, concern for gender eq-
uity implies that strong standards, possibly including restrictions 
on availability of oocyte cryopreservation outside of experimen-
tal studies, must be enforced to ensure that society does not foist 
unsafe fertility management treatments on women rather than 
providing support for fertility choices that do not involve inva-
sive surgery, such as flex-time work and maternity leave. This 
demand for evidence is no different from what is expected of any 
other ART; the issues of gender equity simply make it more im-
portant. 
 Finally, I will consider an surprising possibility for 
autologous ovarian transplantation. Retransplantation can be 
performed either heterotopically, where the ovary is retrans-
planted to another site in the body (often the forearm), or or-
thotopically, where the ovary is returned approximately to its 
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prior location in the pelvis.15 The latter method allows for 
"natural" pregnancy rather than egg retrieval followed by IVF: 
 
In theory, natural pregnancy might be 
achieved via orthotopic transplantation (an 
autograft placed near the infundibulopelvic 
ligament) if the fallopian tubes remain intact 
and the transplant does not become seques-
tered under the peritoneum.16 
 
This method, orthotopic transplantation, worked exactly as de-
scribed above in the case of Ouarda Touirat: "We should stress 
that conception arose spontaneously since neither ovarian stimu-
lation nor IVF had been done."17 Orthotopic transplantation, 
since it does not necessitate IVF, offers fertility preservation to 
patients who, for religious reasons, would not consent to oocyte 
or embryo cryopreservation or to oocyte retrieval from a het-
erotopic transplant followed by IVF. Faiths that reject IVF in-
clude Eastern Orthodoxy and Roman Catholicism,18 as well as 
some interpretations of Jewish tradition.19 Thus, ovarian cryopre-
servation and transplantation could potentially succeed in pre-





Heterologous transplantation introduces an entirely new 
set of ethical questions, many of which relate to organ transplan-
tation and gamete donation rather than gamete cryopreservation. 
The first is that of immunological rejection. It is possible that Sil-
ber's transplant between identical twins will remain a special 
case: "The risk of tissue rejection means that ovary transplants of 
this sort are only really practical with identical twins and there 
just aren't many pairs out there that this could help. "20 However, 
Silber is described as believing that "such a transplant could be 
useful between non-related women, but only if anti-rejection 
medicines became safer."21 Even with such improvements, the 
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risk of rejection remains high:  
 
[A]llografting ovarian tissue is an enormous in-
convenience compared with oocyte donation: it 
requires ongoing immunosuppressant treatment 
to avoid graft rejection. The burden of immuno-
suppressant treatment is known for vital grafts 
such as the kidney, heart liver, or lung; is it per-
missible to accept such a risk for an organ and 
nonvital function as the ovary and fertility? 
 
Also, in the case of an ovarian tissue recipient, immunosuppres-
sant treatment not only affects the woman herself, but may also 
produce worse pregnancy outcomes such as prematurity and 
low birth weight.22 While it is true that many healthy children 
have been born to immunosuppressed patients, accepting addi-
tional risk to the newborn as a result of a treatment primarily in-
tended to produce a healthy newborn seems both illogical and in 
potential violation of the neonate's best interests. 
 Like Henderson23 and Robertson,24 I can conceive of few 
situations where oocyte donation would not be equally effective 
at bringing about desired reproductive outcomes and less haz-
ardous to all individuals concerned. While oocyte donation did 
fail in the St. Louis case, heterologous transplantation was made 
drastically safer by the twins' genetic identity. Thus, heterolo-
gous transplantation seems biologically interesting but medically 
limited. 
 One exception might be in religious cases where IVF 
and/or egg donation are taboo: if the donated ovary is consid-
ered to belong to the gestational mother rather than to the donor, 
then, through heterologous transplantation, a child could be born 
through natural pregnancy to a previously infertile woman. The 
genetic parentage of the child might be considered unimportant. 
There is support for this line of thought in Jewish practice.25 
Given Silber's admirable grasp of the Jewish halachic tradition 
and its impact on ART treatments,26 he may have foreseen this 
option when he made the optimistic comments above. 
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The Jewish idea stated above raises questions about the 
status of the ovary. The ovary, unlike other frequently trans-
planted organs such as the kidney, is both an endocrine and a 
germline tissue. As a germline tissue, it has the capability to con-
tinue the genetic line of the ovary donor. Given this difference, 
does agreeing to organ donation involve agreeing to ovary dona-
tion? Robertson sees this as a possibility:  
 
Women while alive might sign organ donor cards 
that encompass ovarian donation when they die, 
or families might consent to donate the ovaries of 
deceased young women for preservation and later 
reproductive use by infertile couples.27 
 
However, the scenario Robertson envisions involves the use of 
the ovary purely as a source for oocytes, rather than as an organ 
to be transplanted into the body. We do not permit organ trans-
plant recipients, even recipients of other nonessential organs 
such as corneas, to use donor organs for purposes other than im-
plantation into their own bodies; nor do we authorize the next of 
kin to donate or sell a deceased person's organs to private indi-
viduals. Thus, I would argue that "heterologous transplantation" 
as described by Robertson is really postmortem gamete dona-
tion, not organ donation. In Britain, for example, this redefinition 
would prohibit their use without explicit permission from the 
donor herself.28 I do not argue that postmortem game donation is 
wrong -- just that it is not organ transplantation. 
In contrast to the procedure Robertson outlines, a do-
nated ovary could in fact be transplanted into the body of the 
recipient. As well as for the religious reasons outlined above, this 
might be done in order to reap health benefits: "[A]llografting 
has a large advantage over oocyte donation, that of reestablish-
ing the endocrine functions of the ovary and thus enabling the 
grafted patient to avoid need for replacement hormones."29 Dr. 
Silber considered this beneficial effect when making the decision 
to perform ovarian transplantation.30 It could be argued that if a 
ovarian transplant were performed from a cadaver donor, the 
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reproductive potential of the ovary could be considered a case of 
double effect, and the transplant be considered an organ dona-
tion rather than a gamete donation. Consider McCarty's example 
of double effect:  
 
A doctor who believed that abortion was wrong, 
even in order to save the mother's life, might nev-
ertheless consistently believe that it would be per-
missible to perform a hysterectomy on a pregnant 
woman with cancer. In carrying out the hysterec-
tomy, the doctor would aim to save the woman's 
life while merely foreseeing the death of the fetus. 
Performing an abortion, by contrast, would in-
volve intending to kill the fetus as a means to sav-
ing the mother.31 
 
Thus, on the double effect model, one could believe that gamete 
donation was wrong without donor consent and still transplant 
an ovary into a recipient, as long as the aim was organ transfer 
rather than egg transfer. 
 However, aside from the immunological problems al-
ready discussed, there are two arguments against this approach. 
First, there are other ways, such as hormone replacement ther-
apy, to restore hormone levels in the body. It is likely that a hu-
man ovary will be more effective; however, this may not justify 
the potential violation of the donor's wishes. Second, the ovary's 
reproductive function could be separated from its endocrine 
function: donor ovary recipients who are not authorized to use 
the gametes contained in the ovary could be required to undergo 
sterilization or use a near-perfect contraceptive method. This 
would undermine the claim of double effect. Despite these con-
cerns, I believe that the double effect claim is compelling, given 
that the ovary's reproductive and endocrine functions are so 
closely related. It seems counterintuitive to consider a part of 
one's own body to have a right against one that it be treated in a 
certain way. Therefore, to respect the donor's will, I would argue 
that, rather than limiting the rights of organ recipients over their 
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bodies, germline organ donation ought to be separated from so-
matic organ donation in donor consent forms 
This idea of the donor having interests in the state of the 
donated ovary suggests another question: whose ovary is it, 
really -- and whose child is its product? In the St. Louis case, this 
worry was diminished by the shared genetic identity of the twin 
sisters, but would be salient elsewhere. In the case of somatic tis-
sues, the consensus is that they are the recipient's, but in germ-
line donation cases, the donated tissues seem to remain the do-
nor's. For example, in the case of oocyte transfer, the birth 
mother is considered simply a gestational surrogate for the do-
nor's egg. Stephen Munzer argues that DNA identity is a neces-
sary criterion for organ identity, and thus that the donor deter-
mines the eggs produced in their former ovaries: 
 
Again, having the same DNA bears importantly 
on the genetic makeup of children conceived after 
the transplantation of gonads. Though rare, trans-
plants of ovaries and testicles have taken place.  
The donor determines the genetic make-up of ova 
and sperm. This is obviously true in the case of 
ova, for at birth the ovaries of a female contain all 
the ova she will ever possess.32 
 
Genetic determination alone, however, does not establish mater-
nity. The parent of a clone would entirely determine the genetic 
make-up of the clone and of the clone's gametes, but it does not 
follow from this that she would be the parent of the clone's off-
spring. Thus, there must be something more than genetic iden-
tity or genetic determination to parenthood. I argue that a better 
definition of "parent of a child" would be "the individual whose 
ovary secretes the egg from which the child is produced." I also 
argue that, unlike other transplantable tissues such as ova or em-
bryos, the ovary, once transplanted, becomes part of the trans-
plant recipient's body.  
A natural result analogous to that of heterologous ovar-
ian transplantation is empirically present in the documented case 
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of a true hermaphrodite chimera; this person has one ovary and 
one testis, and thus two different germ cell lines.33 This person's 
offspring would not be merely the product of one of the two 
germ cell lines, but of the person. Heterologous ovarian trans-
plantation similarly makes the recipient a germline chimera, just 
as bone marrow transplant recipients become somatic-cell chime-
ras. Just as the natural chimera's offspring, from either cell line, 
would be her own, the offspring would then arguably be the 
ovary recipient's, because they share their genetic material with 
one of the germ lines in her body and are produced by an egg 
from her ovary. While they are also genetically identical to the 
donor's germline and somatic cell lines, this does not imply that 
the donor is their parent. 
I will close by noting the resemblance of this idea to the 
Jewish convention, discussed above, that defines the recipient of 
an ovarian transplant as the mother. Rosner retells this story:  
 
A woman had been infertile for ten years, and 
rather than being required to divorce her hus-
band, she underwent an ovarian transplant, and 
one year later gave birth. They asked Rav Kamel-
haar: Is the donor of the ovary considered to be 
the baby‘s mother, or the woman who bore it? A 
very serious question! He answered with Solo-
monic wisdom: the baby belongs to the woman 
who bore it; though barren for ten years, it is pos-
sible that her own ovary produced the egg in the 
eleventh year of her marriage.34 
 
The ingenious Rabbi Kamelhaar might have been more right 
than he realized. Once the woman undergoes the transplant, the 
ovary really does, I argue, become "her own ovary."  
This example brings ancient religious tradition, cutting-
edge medical science, and the analytical tools of modern philoso-
phy together to answer the questions that ovarian transplanta-
tion raises.  As such, it perfectly encapsulates the project I dis-
cussed at the beginning of the paper -- one that advances and 
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guides new technologies rather than stymieing their progress. As 
ovarian transplantation matures medically and technologically, 
there will be many more opportunities both to benefit and to 
harm, and new ethical investigations will be required. However, 
the fundamental framework of ethical analysis as both interdisci-
plinary informed and forward-looking will remain central to 
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